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I. INTRODUCTION
"The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." I Due to
the advent of pregnancy prevention devices such as prescription contraceptives, women
are able to postpone childbirth while investing in academic degrees and careers. 2 Be-
cause prescription methods of contraceptives are currently available to women only, it is
women who typically bear the financial burden of the cost of birth control. 3 Since birth
control is the most commonly-prescribed drug for women between the ages of eighteen
and forty-four, 4 perhaps it is unsurprising that, when compared to men, women of repro-
ductive age spend sixty-eight percent more on out-of-pocket health care expenditures.
5
This disparity is due, in large part, to the cost of reproductive health care services.
6
Though it is well established that the Constitution protects a woman's right to use
birth control, 7 the issue of whether all women should have access to it at the behest of
the federal government has long been a source of political and legislative debate. 8 Pro-
ponents of mandatory contraceptive coverage legislation are primarily concerned with
the overwhelming percentage of unintended pregnancies in the United States, which ab-
sorbs billions of taxpayer dollars each year9 and contributes to the number of abortions
1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
2. History & Successes, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-
are/history-and-successes.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) ("Women's progress in recent decades-in educa-
tion, in the workplace, in political and economic power can be directly linked to ... women's ability to con-
trol their own fertility.").
3. Pema Levy, Does Providing Birth Control Without Co-Pays to Women Let Men off the Hook?,
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Aug. 5, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/trqian-plan. Under many health insurance
plans, women must often pay twenty to fifty dollars per month for oral contraceptives and hundreds of dollars
for longer-acting methods. Michelle Andrews, Preventing Pregnancy: Should Patients Get Contraceptives
from Health Plans at No Cost?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insu ring-Your-Health/cost-of-birth-control.aspx.
4. N.C Aizenman, New U.S. Rules Require Insurance Coverage for Contraception, WASH. POST (Aug. 1,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-us-rules-require-insurance-coverage-for-
contraception/2011/08/01/gIQAwdTRol story.html.
5. Planned Parenthood Applauds Sen. Stabenou and Rep. Schakowsky Jor Introduction of Health Care
for Women Act, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/ (follow "About
Us" hyperlink; then follow "Newsroom" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases" hyperlink then search "Press
Releases" for "Stabenow"; then follow "PLANNED PARENTHOOD APPLAUDS SEN. STABENOW
AND..." hyperlink) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood]. See also Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Ac-
cess to Preventive Services for Women, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011 /08/womensprevention0801201 Ia.html [hereinafter Expanding
Access] (explaining that, compared to men, women typically need more preventive health services but usually
have fewer financial resources to pay for them).
6. Planned Parenthood, supra note 5.
7. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamental-
ly affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
8. See generally Megan Colleen Roth, Note, Rocking the Cradle iwith Erikson v. Bartell Drug Co.: Con-
traceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step Foriiard, 70 UMKC L. REV. 781 (2002) (arguing that federal con-
traceptive coverage legislation is warranted to decrease the percentage of unintended pregnancies and abortion
in the United States).
9. Rebecca Wind, Nation Pays Steep Price for High Rates of Unintended Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST.
(May 19, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2011/05/19/index.html.
2
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performed.' 0 Conversely, Catholic individuals and affiliated organizations deem any act
that renders procreation impossible as "intrinsically evil"1 I and therefore stand in
staunch opposition to laws that force them to partake in coverage of contraceptive medi-
cations. 
12
While the majority of state legislatures have enacted laws that require the inclusion
of contraceptive drugs and devices in all health plans, 13 congressional efforts to pass
federal contraceptive coverage legislation have consistently failed. 14 The federal gov-
ernment's inability to mandate such coverage, however, ended on March 23, 2010, when
President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("PPACA"), the first comprehensive health care reform bill in the United States. 15 In an
effort to make preventive health care for women more affordable, the PPACA requires
all health insurance plans 16 and issuers 17 to cover all items and services recommended
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") without charg-
ing a co-payment, co-insurance, or a deductible. 8 This includes, amongst other medical
10. See Rebecca Wind, Abortion and Unintended Pregnancy Decline Worldiwide as Contraceptive Use In-
creases, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2009/1 0/13/index.html
("The evidence is strong and growing that empowering women with the means to decide for themselves when
to become pregnant and how many children to have significantly lowers unintended pregnancy rates and there-
by reduces the need for abortion .... ). According to experts, the cost of contraceptives is a contributing factor
to unintended pregnancies. Andrews, supra note 3. While women can purchase generic versions of birth con-
trol pills for prices as low as nine dollars a month, even modest co-pays can act as a deterrent. Ricardo Alonso-
Zaldivar, The Associated Press, Insurers to Cover Birth Control, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011 /08/ /AP-Insurers-to-Cover-Birth-Control.aspx#page 1.
11. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2730, at 629 (Doubleday, 2nd ed. 2003) (1994) ("'[E]very
action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its
natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible' is intrinsi-
cally evil.") (quoting PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE § 14 (1968)).
12. See Annamarya Scaccia, Religious Exemptions and Contraceptive Coverage: Hoi Far Can Denial Go
andStillBe Constitutional?, DAILY Kos (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/09/30/1021600
/-Religious-Exemptions-and-Contraceptive-Coverage:-How-Far-Can-Denial-Go-and-Still-Be-
Constitutional?detail-hide.
13. State Policies in Brief Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec.. 1, 2011),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib JCC.pdf [hereinafter State Policies in Brie].
14. Insurance Coverage for Contraception: A Proven Way to Protect And Promote Women's Health,
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUNDATION 4 (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-
sheets/birth-control-insurance-coverage.pdf [hereinafter Insurance Coverage for Contraception].
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11- 148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as 42
U.S.C. §§ 18001 18121 (2012)).
16. "A group health plan is an employee welfare benefit plan established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization (such as a union), or both, that provides medical care for participants or their de-
pendents directly through insurance, reimbursement, or otherwise." Health Plans and Benefits, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/index.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
17. A health insurance issuer is [a]n insurance, insurance service, or insurance corporation (including an
HMO) that is required to be licensed to engage in the business of insurance in a state and that is subject to state
law that regulates insurance." Health Insurance Issuer, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/ebsa/health/glossary.htm?wd=Health Insurance Issuer (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300gg 13 (2012)). To
assist the HHS in developing these comprehensive guidelines, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") conducted a
scientific study of "preventive services [that] are important to women's health and well-being." Clinical Pre-
ventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INST. OF MED. 1 (July 19, 2011),
http://iom.edu/-/media/Files/Report/ 20Files/2011 /Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-
Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief updated2.pdf"' [hereinafter Preventive Services]. During the
study, "[the JOM] defined preventive health services as measures including medications, procedures, devices,
tests, education, and counseling-shown to improve well-being and/or decrease the likelihood or delay the on-
set of a targeted disease or condition." Id. at 1 2. According to the HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, "These
3
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items and services, all Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved prescription
contraceptive methods. 
19
Although employers that qualify as "religious" under the mandate may seek an ex-
emption from the contraceptive coverage requirement, the exemption criteria are inextri-
cably narrow and only afford protection to churches, houses of worship, and monaster-
ies. 20 Religion-based entities such as hospitals, colleges, universities, and charitable
organizations do not meet the criteria and are therefore excluded.2 1 This restrictive ex-
emption provision is particularly problematic for Catholic-affiliated organizations be-
cause they will be forced to comply with the mandate or pay a penalty for failing to do
so.22 As a result, numerous Catholic organizations across the country have reacted
strongly against the HHS's contraceptive regulation.2 3 The United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops ("USCCB") has become the front-runner in attacking both the constitu-
tionality and legality of the mandate.
24
This article examines the USCCB's religious challenges to the contraceptive cov-
erage mandate under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution 25 as well as the statu-
tory terms of the Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 26 and, in doing
so, ultimately posits that the mandate does not violate the free exercise rights of Catholic
employers. Section 11 provides background information about the social and economic
benefits of prescription contraceptives and presents a brief overview of the contraceptive
equity legislation that preceded the HHS's contraceptive mandate.2 7 Section III sets forth
the USCCB's objections to the contraceptive coverage mandate, focusing specifically on
its religious exercise challenges.2 8 Section IV evaluates the constitutionality of the con-
historic guidelines are based on science and existing literature and will help ensure women get the preventive
health benefits they need." Affordable Care Act Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional
Cost, HHS.Gov (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201 lpres/08/201 10801b.html [hereinafter No
Additional Cost].
19. No Additional Cost, supra note 18.
20. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 147) ("[T]he Departments seek to provide for a religious accommodation that respects the unique
relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial positions.").
21. Julie Rovner, Religious Groups Want Relief from Birth Control Mandate, NPR (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/11/02/141949921/religious-groups-want-relief-from-birth-control-
mandate.
22. Igor Volsky, Pat Toomey: Religious Employers Need Additional Exemptions from Offering Coverage
for Contraceptives, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2011/09/26/328588/pat-
toomey-religious-employers-need-additional -exemptions-from-offering-coverage-for-contraceptives/.
23. See Catholic Colleges Unite to Defend Religious Liberty, Oppose Illegal Contraceptive Mandate,
CARDINAL NEWMAN SoC'Y (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/Home/tabid/36/ctl/
Details/mid/435/ItemID/1127/Default.aspx ("Eighteen Catholic colleges and universities ... joined [together]
in an appeal to the Obama administration to exempt all religious objectors from a mandate requiring health
insurance plans to cover ... contraceptives ...."); Scaccia, supra note 12.
24. See USCCB Urges Rescission of HHS Contraceptive Mandate, Criticizes 'Inexplicably Narrow' Defini-
tion of Religious Freedom, U.S CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2011/11-168.cfm.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). Since 1997,
the RFRA has not applied to state law. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
27. See generally Staci D. Lowell, Note, Striking a Balance: Finding a Place for Religious Conscience
Clauses in Contraceptive Equity Legislation, 52 CLFV. ST. L. REv. 441,443-45 (2004 2005).
28. See Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Michael F. Moses, Interim Final Rule on Preventive Services, U.S.
CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 2, 7 11, 13 (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/about/general-
4
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traceptive mandate as it relates to the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, 29 and
Section V analyzes the legality of the mandate as it pertains to the terms of the RFRA.
30
Section VI concludes that, because the federal contraceptive coverage mandate does not
violate Catholic employers' constitutional or federally guaranteed free exercise rights,
Catholic-affiliated organizations are required to cover their employees' prescription con-
traceptives.31
II. BACKGROUND
A. Benefits of Prescription Contraceptives
Women derive many benefits from the use of prescription contraceptives. 32 For
example, when used consistently and correctly, oral contraceptives are ninety-nine per-
cent effective in preventing unintended pregnancies. 33 In the United States, for every ten
women who are having sex, nine do not desire to become pregnant. 34 Since the average
American woman wants only two children, a woman must use contraceptives for approx-
imately three decades if she wishes to remain sexually active throughout the duration of
her reproductive years. 35 Without contraceptives, a sexually active woman with normal
fertility has an eighty-five percent chance of conceiving a child within one year. 36 Due to
its effectiveness, ninety-eight percent of women in the United States have used contra-
ception at some point during their reproductive years.
37
An unintended pregnancy imposes detrimental consequences for both the woman
and her baby.38 In the United States, half of all pregnancies are unintended, and of this
counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-preventive-services-201 I -08.pdf.
29. See generally Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws
and Exceptions From Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb 4.
31. See Empl't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb 4 (2012).
32. While contraceptives do provide many health benefits to women, they can pose serious health risks as
well. Studies have shown that contraceptives may increase women's risk of developing blood clots. FDA Drug
Safety Communication: Safety Review Update on the Possible Increased Risk of Blood Clots iwith Birth Control
Pills Containing Drospirenone, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm273021.htm. Additionally, taking hormonal contraceptives has been
linked to women acquiring HIV-1. Harold L. Martin Jr. et al., Hormonal Contraception, Sexually Transmitted
Diseases, and Risk of Heterosexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1, 178 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1053, 1053 (1998).
33. H.R. 463, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). "If [birth control] pills are taken every day at the same time, and
each pack is started on time, oral contraceptives are 99% effective in preventing pregnancy. On average, oral
contraceptives are 93-97o effective because women often miss pills or do not start a new pack on time." Oral
Contraceptives: Birth Control Pills, AM. PREGNANCY ASS'N,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/preventingpregnancy/birthcontrolpills.html (last updated Aug. 2003).
34. Lowell, supra note 27, at 443.
35. Michelle Andrews, Health Insurers May Soon Offer Contraceptives at No Extra Cost, WASH. POST (Ju-
ly 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/02/AR2010070204641.html.
36. Omnia M. Samra, Birth Control Behavioral Methods, EMEDICTNEHEALTH,
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/birth-control-behavioral-methods/article em.htm (last updated Aug. 8,
2005).
37. Title X, NAT'L FAM. PLANNING & REPROD. HEALTH Ass'N, http://www.nfprha.org/main/policyaction.
cfin?Category=Key NFPRHA Issues&Section=Titleo20X o2OAction o20Plan (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
38. See Adam Sonfield, Preventing Unintended Pregnancy: The Need and the Means, 6 GUTTMACHER REP.
ON PUB. POL'Y 7 (2003), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/5/grO60507.html.
5
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percentage, four in ten end in abortion. 39 These abortions impose physical and emotional
costs on women. 40 Because contraceptives are an effective means of preventing unin-
tended pregnancies, it follows that affordable contraception decreases the number of
abortions performed. 4 1 Furthermore, women who become pregnant unintentionally are
less likely to receive timely prenatal care and are more likely to drink alcohol, smoke,
become depressed, and become victims of domestic violence during pregnancy. 42 Con-
sequently, a child born as a result of an unintended pregnancy is at greater risk of being
born at a low weight, dying within the first year of life, being subject to abuse, and expe-
riencing developmental problems later in life. 43 By preventing unintended pregnancies,
contraceptives have contributed to a dramatic decrease in maternal and infant mortality
44
and have improved women's overall health by allowing them to plan and space their
pregnancies.
4 5
Prescription contraceptives are not only preventive medications; they provide
many therapeutic health benefits as well. 46 Doctors often prescribe birth control pills to
treat medical conditions such as polycystic ovary syndrome, endometriosis, amenorrhea
(i.e., lack of periods), menstrual cramps, premenstrual syndrome, heavy periods, and ac-
ne.47 Furthermore, since less menstrual bleeding occurs when taking oral contraceptive
pills, the likelihood of developing anemia, endometrial cancer, ovarian cancer, and ovar-
ian cysts decreases.
4 8
In addition to the many medical purposes it serves, the use of contraceptives poses
several social and economic benefits as well.4 9 By reducing the risk of unplanned preg-
nancy, contraceptives allow women to achieve greater freedom by enabling them to in-
vest in a higher education and a career. 50 From a cost-benefit approach, contraceptive
coverage saves public and private health dollars that would otherwise be spent on ex-
penditures derived from unintended pregnancies. 5 1 Even if a baby born as a result of an
39. Facts on Induced Abortions in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 2011),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs /fb induced abortion.html. When considering the percentage of unintended
pregnancies that end in abortion, it is important to note that studies show that contraceptive programs do not
consistently reduce abortion rates. See Greater Access to Contraception Does Not Reduce Abortions, U.S.
CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (July 17, 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/contraception/greater-access-to-contraception-does-not-reduce-abortions.cfm.
40. Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 367
(1998). See also Adam Sonfield, Preventing Unintended Pregnancy: The Need and the Means, 6 GUTTMACHER
REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 7 (2003), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/5/grO60507.html.
41. See Law, supra note 40, at 367.
42. See Jason Kane, Women Should Get Free Birth Control, HHS-Backed Group Urges, PBS NEwSHOUR
(July 19, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/07/women-should-get-free-birth-control-hhs-
backed-report-urges.html.
43. H.R. 463, 111thCong. § 2(2009).
44. Id.
45. Expanding Access, supra note 5.
46. See generally Medical Uses of the Birth Control Pill, CTR. FOR YOUNG WOMEN'S HEALTH,
http://www.youngwomenshealth.org/med-uses-ocp.htm (last updated Oct. 18, 2011).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Lowell, supra note 27 at 443-44.
50. Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies Without
Cost-Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 7 (2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/1/gpr140107.
pdf
51. See Law, supra note 40, at 366-68.
6
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unintended pregnancy is healthy, the financial costs associated with childbirth far out-
weigh the costs of contraceptive coverage. 52 For example, the average bill for a vaginal
birth, when accounting for facility variations, is $7,500, and the average bill for a cesare-
an section is $13,200. 53 Over a five-year study, researchers found that third-party payers,
i.e., employers who provide contraceptive coverage, generally benefit as a result of sav-
ings incurred through lower premium costs and increased profits. 54 According to the
Washington Business Group on Health and William M. Mercer, employers that include
contraceptive coverage in their employees' health plans save fifteen to seventeen percent
after factoring in the direct costs of pregnancy and the indirect costs associated with
pregnancy, e.g., employee absenteeism and decreased productivity. 55 Thus, it is econom-
ically efficient for employers to include contraceptive coverage in their employees'
health insurance plans.
56
B. Legislative Backdrop: The Emergence of the HHS's Contraceptive Coverage
Mandate
While the emergence of contraceptive equity legislation has become prominent
among the states in the last decade, it was not until insurance companies began to cover
Viagra, a well-known male impotence drug, in the mid-1990s that interest groups began
pressuring lawmakers to pass mandatory contraceptive coverage legislation. 57 As a result
of this seeming inequity between the sexes, twenty-eight states have enacted some form
of contraceptive equity legislation to date. 58 However, state laws are unable to regulate
self-insured plans (plans funded by the employer instead of an insurance company),
which are governed exclusively by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").5 9 Since nearly half of all Americans who rely on employer-sponsored in-
surance work for employers offering self-insured plans, state efforts to provide women
unrestricted contraceptive access have proven only mildly effective. 60 In 1998, the fed-
eral government implemented the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan ("FEHBP"),
which extended coverage of all prescription contraceptives to federal employees.
6 1
Since the FEHBP only applies to federal workers, leaving millions of private-sector em-
52. Id. at 366.
53. Jennifer Brown, Women Pay up to 50% More for Health Insurance Premiums', DENVER POST (Oct. 25,
2009), http://www.denverpost.com/frontpage/ci 13636522.
54. James Trussell et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 494, 500 (1995).
55. Adam Sonfield, Contraception: An Integral Component of Preventive Care for Women, 13
GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV.2, 7 (2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gprl30202.html.
56. See Covering Prescription Contraceptives in Employee Health Plans: How This Coverage Saves Mon-
ey, NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. 1 2 (May 2006), http://www.cluw.org/PDF/ContraceptiveCoverageSaves
Money.pdf.
57. Contraceptive Equity Bills Gain Momentum in State Legislatures, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Aug. 1,
2005), http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/contraceptive-equity-bills-gain-momentum-in-state-
legislatures [hereinafter Contraceptive Equity Bills].
58. State Policies in Brief supra note 13.
59. See Roth, supra note 8, at 788-89.
60. See Insurance Coverage for Contraception, supra note 14, at 3. See also Roth, supra note 8, at 792
("The maximum number of women who could possibly be affected by state laws is roughly thirteen percent.").
61. Cheyrl A. Danner, Prescription Contraceptives: Educate Yourself on the Discrimination You May Be
Suffering Because You Workfor a Private Educational Institution, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 513, 518 (2002).
7
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ployees without coverage, Congress has repeatedly introduced the Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act ("EPICC"). 62 The EPICC would require all
health plans, including self-insured plans, that provided coverage for prescription drugs
to provide comparable coverage for all FDA-approved prescription contraceptive meth-
ods. 63 Due to religious freedom concerns, however, the EPICC lacked the support neces-
sary for passage. 64 Thus, the HHS mandate is the first piece of federal legislation that
extends contraceptive coverage to every health plan in the United States.65 Since it
reaches self-insured plans as well as plans that do not provide prescription drug cover-
age, it is the most comprehensive contraceptive mandate in the history of the United
States.
66
Ill. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS' SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS
In response to the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate, the USCCB submitted a
comment in which it urged the HHS to reconsider its decision to include contraceptives
as a preventive service. 67 In setting forth its religious objections to the contraceptive
mandate, the USCCB vehemently argued that requiring employers to provide contracep-
tive coverage in their health plans violates a spectrum of constitutional and other federal-
ly guaranteed rights. 68 Specifically, the USCCB asserts that the mandate violates consti-
tutional guarantees under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as well as
statutory protections under the terms of the RFRA.
69
As a basis for its challenges, the USCCB claims that the contraceptive mandate
triggers strict scrutiny 70  the highest level of judicial review pursuant to which laws
and regulations must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling government inter-
est" to pass constitutional muster.71 When determining the constitutionality of a particu-
lar law, the court's standard of review is very important to, if not dispositive of, the out-
come. 72 Here, the USCCB argues that disease prevention is not a compelling
government interest because contraceptives do not prevent disease; rather, contraceptives
are a method by which women "prevent the healthy state of pregnancy."' 73 Moreover, the
62. Id.
63. Lowell, supra note 27, at 451.
64. See Danner, supra note 61.
65. See Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 5-13.
69. Id. at 7 13. USCCB also challenges the constitutionality and legality of the inclusion of sterilization
and contraceptive counseling in the comprehensive guidelines and argues that mandating coverage of contra-
ceptives, sterilization, and related counseling violates the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 2, 13. Since cer-
tain FDA-approved contraceptives are believed by some to operate as abortion-inducing medications, the
USCCB contends that the mandate violates the Weldon Amendment and the PPACA's abortion and non-
preemption provisions. Id. at 5 7. These issues are outside the scope of this comment.
70. Id. at9-10.
71. See generally Constitutional Laii First Amendment En Banc Third Circuit Strikes Doiwn Federal
Statute Prohibiting the Interstate Sale of Depictions of Animal Cruelty. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d
218 (3d Cir. 2008) (En Banc), 122 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1242 (2009) (discussing the importance of the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny in First Amendment analysis).
72. Id. at 1239 43.
73. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 10-11.
8
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USCCB argues, Congress itself did not seek to include contraceptive coverage in the
PPACA; therefore, the HHS's decision to include contraceptives as a preventive service
cannot possibly fulfill a compelling government interest. 74 In the alternative, the USCCB
argues that, even if the government could prove that its interest was somehow compel-
ling, the means used to achieve that interest - i.e., the contraceptive mandate - are not
narrowly tailored because several religious organizations and individuals will drop health
insurance coverage altogether to avoid compromising their beliefs.75
The Free Exercise Clause is embedded within the First Amendment of the Consti-
tution, which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 76 As a basis for its free exercise chal-
lenge, the USCCB argues that the federal contraceptive coverage mandate triggers strict
scrutiny review because, while neutral on its face, it implicitly targets Catholicism in its
operation and therefore discriminates against religion. 77 Alternatively, the USCCB al-
leges that because the mandate forces those religiously opposed to contraceptive use to
contradict their religious beliefs, the mandate imposes a "substantial burden" upon Cath-
olic employers. 78 Since the mandate provides a religious exemption for a select group of
Catholic organizations, the USCCB argues that this substantial burden is applied pursu-
ant to a system of "individualized exemptions," thereby triggering strict scrutiny re-
view.
79
In addition to asserting objections pursuant to these constitutional theories, the
USCCB argues that the contraceptive coverage mandate is unlawful because it violates
the RFRA, which provides that the government may not "substantially burden a per-
son's exercise of religion," even by a law of general applicability, without demonstrating
that the application of that burden is "the least restrictive means" to advance a "compel-
ling government interest."
8 1
In sum, the USCCB demands that the HHS rescind the contraceptive mandate in its
entirety. 82 If the HHS is unwilling to do so, the USCCB argues, then it must expand the
narrow religious exemption to rectify the grave constitutional and legal problems that
currently exist.83 The USCCB warns the H-H-S that unless it promulgates a broader ex-
emption that encompasses all stakeholders with a religious objection to contraceptives,
the courts will not uphold the mandate as applied to Catholic organizations.
84
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 9.
78. Id. at 9 10.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb l(a) (b) (2012).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS
A. Limitation of Free Exercise Protection
As a nation founded upon the principle of religious freedom, the United States re-
mains wedded to the notion of religious practice free from governmental intrusion. 8 5 The
principle of religious freedom as protected by the First Amendment is not, however,
without limitation; 86 the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence establishes the de-
gree to which the government may infringe upon an individual's practice of religion. 87 In
discerning whether a governmental law or regulation unconstitutionally interferes with
an individual's manifestation of religion, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
"religious beliefs" and "religious conduct." 88 In 1940, the Supreme Court first began ar-
ticulating rules pertaining to when the government can impose regulations that infringed
on individuals' free exercise rights. 8 9 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court distin-
guished religious beliefs from religious conduct, stating that the Free Exercise Clause
"embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for
the protection of society. '9 1 Cantwell clearly conveyed that while religious beliefs and
speech are absolute, freedom of individual conduct that is motivated by religious belief is
afforded less protection.
9 2
B. The Sherbert Test
Prior to 1900, the Supreme Court applied the "substantial burden" test to almost all
general laws that burdened the free exercise of religion, whereby a law imposing a sub-
stantial burden on religion cannot be enforced unless it survives strict scrutiny i.e.,
serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 93 The
Supreme Court first applied the substantial burden test in 1963 in the landmark case of
Sherbert v. Verner,9 4 where the Court held that the State's interest in preventing the fil-
ing of fraudulent unemployment compensation claims was not compelling enough to jus-
85. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. ofAbington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 23(1963) ("The Free Exer-
cise Clause ... withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free
exercise of religion.").
86. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986) (holding that the government need not comply
with an individual's claim that making his Social Security number available violated his religious beliefs).
87. Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers' Beliefs
and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1725 (1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court's free exercise
jurisprudence established the boundaries for government infringement on an individual's religious practices).
88. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion
or Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1187, 1200 (2005).
89. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 303 04.
92. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (citation omitted) ("Not all bur-
dens on religion are unconstitutional .... The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that
it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.").
93. The Supreme Court made exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny for laws and regulations deal-
ing with prisons and the military. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (prisons); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (military).
94. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10
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tify infringing on a citizen's right to free exercise. 95 The plaintiff in Sherbert, a member
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was fired for refusing to work on Saturday be-
cause her religion forbade laboring on that day. 96 Because the plaintiff refused to work
on Saturdays, she was unable to locate new employment and subsequently filed an appli-
cation for unemployment benefits. 9 7 The state unemployment commission denied the
plaintiff benefits on the ground that she would not "accept suitable work when of-
fered."
98
In applying the substantial burden test to the Free Exercise Clause for the first
time, the Court first inquired as to whether the State's action did in fact substantially
burden the plaintiff because of her religious beliefs. 99 The Court observed that the
State's denial of benefits to the plaintiff "derive[d] solely from the practice of her reli-
gion ... and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion ... on the other hand."'100 This type of burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion, the Court believed, was tantamount to imposing a fine against an individual for
worshipping on Saturday.101 Next, the Court examined whether or not the State's action
furthered a compelling state interest. 102 In response to this inquiry, the Court held that
the State's unemployment statute abridged the plaintiffs right to free exercise of her re-
ligion because the State's interest in unifying its unemployment compensation rules to
prevent fraudulent religious objections was not compelling. 103 Additionally, the Court
found that even if the State's interest in unifying its unemployment benefits rules was
compelling, it would nevertheless be incumbent upon the government to prove that the
law was narrowly tailored and that, as such, it was the least restrictive means of further-
ing that interest. 
104
The most prominent application of the substantial burden test came nine years later
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 5 which modified the Sherbert test by requiring that the religious
belief at issue be "legitimate." 10 6 In Yoder, the Court analyzed whether the Free Exercise
Clause protected the Amish community's belief that children should not go to school
through the age of sixteen by asking whether the belief was "one of deep religious con-
viction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living." 107 Finding
that the belief satisfied all three criteria, the Court held that the application of Wiscon-
sin's compulsory school attendance law was invalid as applied to Amish students. 10 8 The
Court justified its extensive analysis by reasoning that, "[w]here fundamental claims of
95. Id. at 407.
96. Id. at 399.
97. Id. at 399-400.
98. Id. at 401 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. at 403.
100. Id. at 404.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 406.
103. Id. at 406-07.
104. Id. at 407.
105. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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religious freedom are at stake,... we must searchingly examine the interests that the
State seeks to promote ... and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from
recognizing the claimed ... exemption." 10 9 The balancing test of Sherbert, as modified
by Yoder, came to be known as the substantial burden test, which can be articulated as
follows: if a law substantially burdens an individual's free exercise of religion, the gov-
ernment must exempt the religious believer from the law, unless the government can
demonstrate that the law serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest. 110 This test governed free exercise jurisprudence until
1990.111
C. The Smith Test
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court limited the applicability of the substantial
burden test in Employment Division v. Smith.112 In Smith, the Court held that laws of
"neutral law and general applicability" need not be subject to strict scrutiny review, even
if the laws have the incidental effect of burdening religious free exercise. 113 Thus, the
Court restricted the application of the substantial burden test so as to only invalidate laws
that specifically target a religious practice. 114 In Smith, the South Carolina unemploy-
ment commission denied two men unemployment compensation benefits after they were
fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug used by adherents to the
Native American Church for sacramental purposes. 1 15 Since peyote was a prohibited
substance under the State's law, the unemployment agency determined that the employ-
ees were discharged for "misconduct" and, therefore, ineligible for unemployment bene-
fits. 1 16
The plaintiffs claimed that the State's refusal to grant them unemployment benefits
based on their use of peyote was a violation of their free exercise rights under Sherbert's
test.1 17 The Court, however, held that the State's denial of the plaintiffs' employment
compensation benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 118 As a basis for its
holding, the Court noted that the law at issue was neutral because it did not specifically
target the Native American Church and was generally applicable because it prohibited all
citizens from using peyote. 119 The Court explained that:
[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions
of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
109. Id. at221.
110. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Sherbert, 374
U.S. 398.
111. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 878-79 (holding that where a restraint on religion "is not the object ... but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended").
114. See id. at 878.
115. Id. at 874.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 876.
118. Id. at 890.
119. Id. at 878.
12
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policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental ac-
tion on a religious objector's spiritual development." To make an indi-
vidual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coin-
cidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is
"compelling"-permitting him by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law
unto himself,"-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense. 120
Thus, Smith implicitly overruled Sherbert by establishing that unless a challenged
law or regulation intentionally discriminates against religious conduct, courts have no
discretion to decide whether or not the plaintiff should be granted a religious exemption
from the law. 121 Smith alleviated the strictness of this new rule, however, by preserving
the courts' ability to apply strict scrutiny when the government action "len[ds] itself to
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."
122
Smith set a new standard for free exercise jurisprudence, which can be expressed as fol-
lows: when a law lacks neutrality, general applicability, or is applied pursuant to a sys-
tem of individualized exceptions, the law must survive strict scrutiny review to avoid vi-
olating the Free Exercise Clause. 123 The meanings of each of these standards, as
developed and refined by subsequent case law, are discussed in turn below.
1. Neutral and General Applicability
In Smith, the Supreme Court merely laid out the bare contours of the "neutral and
generally applicable" test, providing relatively little guidance to lower courts as to how
the test should be applied in future cases. 124 Since Smith, only one Supreme Court deci-
sion has interpreted and applied the neutral and generally applicable test: Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.125 In Lukumi, the plaintiffs were adherents of the
Santeria religion, which sacrifices animals as a form of worship. 12 6 After the Santerians
announced their plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, Florida, the city adopt-
ed ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of animals, which it claimed furthered the gov-
ernment's interest in promoting public health and preventing animal cruelty. 127 After
concluding that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable, the Court
120. Id. at 885 (internal citations omitted).
121. Id. at 878.
122. Id. at 884. Many cases following Sherbert involved religious individuals who were denied unemploy-
ment benefits by government employees who were accorded a high degree of discretion in assessing appli-
cants' eligibility benefits. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that denial
of unemployment benefits to worker who refused to work on Sundays violates free exercise rights); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits
to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays violates free exercise rights); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits to Jeho-
vah's Witness who quit job in factory when transferred to manufacturing armaments position violates free ex-
ercise rights).
123. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1074.
124. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
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applied strict scrutiny. 12 8 The Court held that the law was unconstitutional because the
government could have achieved the goal of safe and sanitary disposal of animal remains
without targeting the Santeria religion - i.e., the ordinance was not the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the purported interest. 129
When evaluating whether a law is neutral as applied to a religious practice, a
court's fundamental concern is whether the government intends to prohibit conduct for
"religiously motivated" reasons. 130 When conducting this determination, three questions
are relevant: (1) "does the law target religious practices on its face?" 13 1; (2) if the law is
neutral on its face, does it discriminate "in its object or purpose?" 132; and (3) if the law
has a discriminatory intent, "[d]oes the law discriminate in its actual operation or ef-
fect?" 133 In applying this tripartite test in Lukumi, the Court noted that the law prohibit-
ing the ritual sacrifice of animals was facially neutral. 134 Nonetheless, the Court
acknowledged its duty to inquire further to determine whether the law was discriminato-
ry in its object or purpose. 135 Therefore, the Court reviewed the legislative record for any
evidence that was suggestive of discriminatory intent on the part of the legislators. 136
Under this examination, the Court found that the particular resolution adopted recited
that residents of the city had expressed their concerns regarding a certain religion's prac-
tices. 137 The resolution also reiterated the city's commitment to prohibiting such acts by
religious groups. 138 Furthermore, the Court noted that the text of the ordinance spoke of
"sacrifice" and "ritual," which the Court believed offered support for a finding of dis-
criminatory intent in the legislative record. 139 Review of this evidence, however, did not
conclude the Court's inquiry as to the neutrality of the law, for, as the Court indicated, a
law must actually discriminate in its effect to be considered an unconstitutional burden
on the free exercise of religion. 
140
In evaluating the effect of the ordinances, the Court delved into a general applica-
bility analysis, which focuses on the design, construction, and enforcement of a law and
128. Id. at 546-47.
129. Id. at 546.
130. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1076.
131. Id. at 1077 "[A] law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning
discernible from the language or context." Id. (quoting Lukuni, 508 U.S. at 533).
132. Id. "Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical background of the decision under
challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment of official policy in question, and the legisla-
tive or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking
body." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. It is not completely clear whether a neutrality inquiry should entail delving
into the subjective motivations of the legislature or should only focus on the effect of the law in its operation.
See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1076 n.146 (noting that Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in Lukumi, but
only Justice Stevens joined the part of the opinion in which the Court found that the judiciary should consider
circumstantial evidence).
133. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1077.
134. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-35.
135. Id. at 534.
136. Id. at 534-35.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 534 (noting that while the use of the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" were not sufficient to compel a
finding that the legislature targeted the Santeria religion, the words did garner support for the conclusion that
there was discriminatory intent on the part of the legislature in drafting the ordinance).
140. Id. at 535.
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss1/5
STALLNGS (Do NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013 12:49 PM
2012 A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW 131
is best suited for determining whether the law's actual purpose is to discriminate against
a religious practice. 14 1 When conducting a general applicability inquiry, two questions
are relevant, and an affirmative response to either question is sufficient to determine that
a law lacks general applicability. 142 First, did the legislature design the law to achieve a
specific, as opposed to a general, purpose? 14 3 And second, does the construction of the
law warrant an actual operation that exclusively targets religious conduct or a particular
religion?
144
In light of the city's purported interest in preventing animal cruelty, the Lukumi
Court focused on the exceptions to the law that allowed the killing of animals by other
religions, such as kosher slaughtering of animals, as well as those that allowed the killing
of animals for nonreligious purposes, such as hunting. 145 Because the ordinances were
designed to proscribe animal killings for religious sacrifice, but to exclude virtually all
secular killings, the Court noted that the ordinances constituted a "religious gerryman-
der" and, as such, "an impermissible attempt to target [Santeria believers] and their reli-
gious practices."' 14 6 When evaluating the actual operation of the law, the Court found
that the rituals of Santeria Church members were virtually the only conduct subject to the
ordinance.147 This led the Court to conclude that the law, while neutral on its face, spe-
cifically targeted Santeria religious practices in operation.148 Therefore, the Court deter-
mined that the ordinance was neither neutral nor generally applicable, and as such, the
constitutionality of the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny review. 149
2. The HHS's Contraceptive Mandate is Neutral and Generally Applicable
Pursuant to free exercise jurisprudence established by Smith and Lukumi, the
USCCB argues that the HHS mandate constitutes a "'religious gerrymander' that targets
Catholicism" and that, while neutral on its face, the mandate discriminates in its actual
operation. 150 In reaching this conclusion, the USCCB misconstrues the reasoning in
Lukumi and incorrectly applies the neutral and general applicability test. 
151
Upon an initial textual reading of the mandate, it appears facially neutral.
152
Therefore, pursuant to the Smith test, a court must look to any evidence that suggests the
HHS intended to discriminate against Catholicism. 153 In its comment to the HHS, the
USCCB notes that many secular employers provided contraceptive coverage to their em-
ployees prior to the federal mandate, which indicates that the purpose of the mandate is
141. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1077.
142. See id. at 1078-79.
143. Id. at 1078.
144. Id. at 1079.
145. Lukurn 508 U.S. at 536-37.
146. Id. at 535.
147. Id. at 535 36.
148. Id. at 535.
149. Id. at 542 57.
150. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535).
151. Lukuin, 508 U.S. at 535-37.
152. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
153. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
15
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to force employers with religious objections to do the same. 154 In Lukumi, the Court not-
ed that it would consider certain types of evidence when evaluating discriminatory in-
tent. 155 Such evidence includes, but is not limited to, the historical background of the
government's challenged action, events preceding the enactment of the law at issue, and
administrative or legislative history. 156 Since the percentage of secular employers that
provided contraceptive coverage prior to the federal mandate provides relevant historical
background information, this evidence may suggest that the purpose of the mandate is to
discriminate against the Catholic religion.' 57 Therefore, a court must determine whether
the mandate actually discriminates in operation. 
158
Although the USCCB adopts Lukumi's phrasing - claiming the mandate is a "re-
ligious gerrymander" 159  _ the circumstances that prompted the particular fimding in
Lukumi do not exist here. 160 In Lukumi, the Court found that the ordinances were de-
signed to regulate the specific animal killings by Santeria Church members as opposed to
the killings of animals in general. 16 1 In this situation, the federal contraceptive coverage
mandate is very comprehensive with regard to the purported interest that it seeks to ad-
vance - i.e., providing women contraceptive coverage. 162 With the exception of health
plans that are grandfathered in, the mandate ensures that every woman with health insur-
ance will have access to contraceptives as well as a host of other services that are vital to
women's reproductive well-being. 163
Furthermore, the construction of the contraceptive mandate does not warrant an ac-
tual operation that exclusively targets Catholicism. 164 The USCCB argues that, "the
class that suffers under the mandate is defined precisely by their beliefs." 165 This con-
tention, however, is not accurate. 166 Employers associated with the Catholic Church are
not the only employers impacted by the mandate; indeed, several secular employers did
not provide contraceptive coverage prior to the federal mandate and must also conform
their conduct accordingly. 167 For this reason, there is no evidence that the mandate tar-
gets only Catholic practices or that the HHS has singled out the Catholic Church for pur-
poses of discrimination. 168
Therefore, a correct application of the Court's reasoning in Lukumi warrants a
154. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 n.16.




159. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting Lukuni, 508 U.S. at 535).
160. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 36.
161. Id. at 535-37.
162. Cf id. at 547 (noting that the uniform purpose of preventing cruelty to animals was extensively under-
mined by the numerous secular exceptions because animals that were killed for secular purposes, such as scien-
tific research, would be no less likely to constitute animal cruelty than animals killed for religious purposes).
163. See Expanding Access, supra note 5.
164. Cf Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 ("[A]lmost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances was] the religious
exercise of Santeria church members.").
165. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 8.
166. Cf Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535.
167. See generally State Policies in Brief, supra note 13.
168. Cf Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535.
16
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finding that the HHS mandate is both neutral and generally applicable. 169 Thus, the
mandate will not be subject to strict scrutiny review under the Free Exercise Clause un-
less it contains a "mechanism for individualized exemptions," i.e., the Sherbert exception
applies.
170
3. The Sherbert Exception
When determining whether a law contains a mechanism for individualized exemp-
tions - thereby placing it outside the scope of Smith - courts focus on the enforcement
of the law to determine whether it is being applied inconsistently among different reli-
gions or as between religious and secular individuals. 171 Under this type of analysis, the
courts' primary concern is the government's ability to assess who is exempt from and
who must comply with the law. 172 This concern stems from the fact that such a decision
is purely discretionary, and the government can use this decision-making authority in a
discriminatory manner. 173 In Smith, the Court noted that the Sherbert line of cases all
involved religious individuals who were denied unemployment benefits by government
employees who were accorded a high degree of discretion in assessing the applicants'
eligibility benefits.1 74 In other words, unelected officials were making entirely subjective
determinations of whether an applicant's reason for seeking unemployment benefits con-
stituted "good cause." 
17 5
When determining whether the Sherbert exception is applicable, a court must first
consider whether the law in question contains a mechanism akin to the "good cause" cri-
terion, allowing significant discretion.176 If such a mechanism is present, the court must
then determine whether the law is enforced discriminatorily. 177 This determination fo-
cuses on whether the exemption is enforced impartially as between secular and religious
applicants or among different religious applicants. 178 However, it is not enough that a
challenged law or regulation allows exemptions based on subjective criteria; if the gov-
erment does not enforce the law in a discriminatory manner, the Sherbert exception is
inapplicable. 179
169. See generally id. at 531-47.
170. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012) (citation omitted).
171. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1080-81.
172. Id. at 1083.
173. Lukuin, 508 U.S. at 542 ("All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of para-
mount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice."). See also Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (reasoning that the government's "refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of
religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent").
174. Smith, 494 U.S at 884.
175. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1081.
176. Id. This includes laws, statutes, regulations and policies that contain "good cause" exceptions, or pro-
hibit conduct "other than in cases of hardship," or that apply in "exceptional circumstances." ld. at 1081 n.175.
Each of these exceptions requires an assessment of an individual's specific circumstances "without reference to
any ... objective standard." Id.
177. Id. at 1081.
178. See, e.g., Rader v. Johnson, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1546-47, 1551 (D. Neb. 1966) (finding that an exemp-
tion that required a university administrator to determine whether a student should be allowed to live off-
campus due to "significant and truly exceptional circumstances" was not enforced impartially as between reli-
gious and secular applicants and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny review).
179. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1081.
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4. The Sherbert Exception Does Not Apply to the IIHS's Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate
Under the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate, an employer may apply for a
religious exemption, pursuant to which the employer will not be penalized if it does not
provide contraceptive coverage in its employees' health plans. 180 For an organization to
qualify as a "religious employer," it must meet the following four criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organiza-
tion.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the reli-
gious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
18 1
In addressing this religious exemption provision, the USCCB argues that the
HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate contains a system of "individualized exemp-
tions," whereby the HHS will apply this exemption to exclude certain employers from
complying with the contraceptive mandate on a case-by-case basis. 182 The USCCB
claims that the mandate triggers the Sherbert exception because it "stands in stark con-
trast to the kind of across-the-board rules that the Court in Smith was so concerned to in-
sulate from constitutional challenge in cases where they happen to burden religious [free]
exercise." 
183
This assertion constitutes an inaccurate interpretation of the Sherbert exception, for
it assumes that the law is subject to strict scrutiny review any time the government ap-
plies an exemption on a case-by-case basis. 184 The USCCB fails to consider that alt-
hough Smith established that the government is not required to grant religious believers
an exemption from a law of neutral and general applicability, the legislature still has the
option to grant religious believers exemptions from the law or regulation at issue.
185
Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia explained that "[i]t may fairly be said
that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself." 186 Thus, Smith's free exercise precedent did not prohibit
180. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
181. Id. In issuing this narrow exemption, the HHS intended to extend contraceptive coverage "to as many
women as possible" by "respect[ing] the unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in
ministerial positions." Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3,2011) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
182. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 9-10.
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id.
185. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
186. Id.
18
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legislatures from exempting religious institutions from laws of neutral and general ap-
plicability, but rather encouraged it.
Under a Sherbert exception analysis, the court must first determine if the HHS's
authority to assess whether a particular organization qualifies as a "religious employer"
for purposes of the exemption constitutes a mechanism similar to the "good cause" crite-
rion, affording the HHS unrestricted discretionary interpretation. 187 In regard to this in-
quiry, the contraceptive coverage mandate is vulnerable to attack because the HHS will
effectively assess each organization that applies for an exemption based on whether it
has the "purpose" of inculcating religious values and whether it "primarily" serves and
employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization. 18 8 The terms "pur-
pose" and "primarily" are so amorphous that a court could easily view the exemption
provision as a grant of unchecked discretion. 189 Therefore, the court must continue its
analysis to determine whether the HHS enforces the exemption impartially among differ-
ent religions.190 To prevail under this inquiry, a Catholic organization must show that the
HHS denied it an exemption from the contraceptive mandate, but granted one to some
other religiously affiliated organization. 191 Absent a Catholic employer's ability to show
such evidence of discrimination in the enforcement of the regulation, the Sherbert excep-
tion does not apply, and the mandate will not be subject to strict scrutiny review under
the Free Exercise Clause. 
192
In summary, the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate is neutral, generally ap-
plicable, and does not contain a mechanism of individualized exemptions; therefore, the
court will presume its constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause. 193 Consequently,
a Catholic employer must prove that the contraceptive coverage mandate violates the
statutory protections of the RFRA in order to subject the mandate to strict scrutiny re-
view. 194
V. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT JURISPRUDENCE AND ANALYSIS
A. RFRA Jurisprudence and 0 Centro
The Supreme Court's holding in Smith sparked public outrage and prompted sev-
eral religious leaders, churches, civil liberties and religious organizations, and politicians
to lobby Congress to overturn Smith by statute. 195 In 1993, Congress overtly counter-
manded the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith by pass-
187. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1081.
188. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
189. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981) (noting that
Indiana requires individuals who apply for unemployment compensation to demonstrate that they left their job
for "good cause" in connection with the job).
190. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1080-81. Since the exemption only applies to religious organizations, it is not
necessary to inquire as to whether the standards are applied impartially as between secular and religious organ-
izations.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1080 83.
193. Id. at 1074.
194. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb 4 (2012).
195. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 1049 n.18.
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ing the RFRA, which has become "one of the most controversial pieces of legislation"
enacted during the Clinton administration. 196 The RFRA provides that the government
may not "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion," even by a law of general
applicability, without demonstrating that the application of the burden is "the least re-
strictive means" to advance a "compelling government interest."' 19 7 Congress based its
decision to pass the RFRA on findings that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise."' 198 In
essence, where the Supreme Court failed to recognize a constitutional right to religious
free exercise, Congress created one by statute. 
199
Four years later in City of Boerne v. Flores,20 the Supreme Court declared the
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws on the ground that it created rights
against state governments that Congress had no power to impose under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 201 The Court was silent, however, with regard to whether
the RFRA could be applied to federal laws. 202 Then, in 2006, the Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld the RFRA as valid and enforceable against the federal government in
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unice do Vegetal.203 In 0 Centro, the Court
pronounced guiding principles for determining when courts should exempt a religious
believer from a federal law under the RFRA. 20 4 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie RFRA case by proving that the application of a federal law or regulation imposes a
substantial burden on a sincere exercise of his religion. 2 05 If the plaintiff is successful,
the burden of proof then shifts to the govermnent to demonstrate that the burden furthers
a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of advancing that in-
terest.
20 6
In 0 Centro, the plaintiffs were members of a Brazilian Spiritist sect that con-
sumed a hallucinogenic tea for sacramental purposes. 207 The tea contained dimethyltryp-
tamine (generally referred to as "DMT"), a hallucinogen that is outlawed under the Con-
trolled Substances Act. 20 8 After customs inspectors seized a shipment containing three
drums of the tea, the sect filed suit against the government seeking declaratory and in-
196. Travis C. Wheeler, Note, An Economic Analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 573, 573 (2000). While the RFRA invokes debate over the meaning of the Constitution's
text, the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment drafters, and basic policy questions concerning separation of
powers, federalism, and individual rights, these issues are outside the scope of this discussion.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb l(a) (b). The stated purpose of the RFRA, reflected in the title of the act, was "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 17erner and Wisconsin v. Yoder." Id. §
2000bb(b)(1).
198. Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
199. Wheeler, supra note 196, at 575.
200. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
201. Id. at 508.
202. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1 (2006) ("As origi-
nally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, we held
the application to States to be beyond Congress' legislative authority under [Section Five] of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (internal citation omitted)).
203. Id. at418-39.
204. Id. at 428.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 424.
207. Id. at 423.
208. Id. at 425.
20
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junctive relief under the RFRA. 2 09 Conceding substantial burden of a sincere religious
belief, the government sought to justify its actions by arguing that it had a compelling
interest in preventing the diversion of DMT from the members of the sect to nonreligious
users. 21 To support this purported interest, the government noted an increase in the ille-
gal use of hallucinogens, and DMT in particular.
2 11
In contesting the government's assertion, the sect members argued that the market
for DMT was small, that the sect only imported small amounts of the tea, and that there
had been no problem with diversion in the past. 2 12 Upon concluding that the evidence of
diversion to nonreligious users was "virtually balanced," the Court held that the govern-
ment failed to demonstrate a compelling interest. 2 13 By upholding the application of the
RFRA to federal law, the Supreme Court left Smith intact but also recognized a new
framework in free exercise jurisprudence, which can be articulated as follows: if a reli-
gious believer establishes that the application of a federal law or regulation constitutes a
substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion, the government must provide suffi-
cient evidence that application of the law or regulation is the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling interest.
2 14
B. Catholic Employers Can Raise a Prima Facie Case that the Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate Violates Its Rights Under RFRA
According to the precedent set forth in 0 Centro, a Catholic employer can success-
fully raise a prima facie case under the RFRA because the HHS's contraceptive coverage
mandate imposes a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of the Catholic religion by
forcing Catholic employers to provide their employees coverage for contraceptives.
215
Although the existence of a substantial burden was a nonissue in 0 Centro, Sherbert pre-
viously established that a substantial burden exists, at a minimum, when the law or regu-
lation at issue forces an individual "to choose between following the precepts of her reli-
gion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept [government benefits], on the other hand." 2 16 Catholic em-
ployers will likely meet this threshold because the HHS's contraceptive coverage man-
date would force them to choose between providing contraceptive coverage in their em-
ployees' health plans and paying a penalty for dropping its employees' health insurance
coverage altogether.
2 17
Furthermore, courts should find that the Catholic Church's religious objection to
209. Id. at 425 26.
210. Id. at 426. The government also set forth two additional compelling interests arguments to justify its
action: "protecting the health and safety of [the sect] members ... and complying with the 1971 United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, a treaty signed by the United States." Id. These arguments present
issues that are outside the scope of this article.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 426-27, 439 (citation omitted).
214. See, e.g., id. at 428 39.
215. See id. at 428 (stating that a claimant must prove that enforcement of a federal law "would (1) substan-
tially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise" to establish a prima facie RFRA case).
216. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codi-
fied as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d 2 (2012)).
21
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birth control is sincere, for its belief that contraception is "intrinsically evil" is deeply
rooted in its religious teachings on the sacrament of marriage, human sexuality, and pro-
creation. 2 18 The sincerity of this belief is further illustrated by the Catholic Church's
maintenance of its stance against the use of birth control, despite mounting opposition
towards its position on the issue. 2 19 If, as the foregoing argument suggests is possible, a
Catholic employer establishes a prima facie case under the RFRA, the HHS must
demonstrate that the mandate furthers a compelling government interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
220
C. The HHS's Contraceptive Coverage Mandate is the Least Restrictive Means of
Furthering a Compelling Government Interest
Once the burden of proof shifts to the government, the HHS will be able to prove
that it has a compelling interest in providing women the preventive care necessary to stay
healthy and that the contraceptive coverage mandate is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. The Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance as to what
constitutes a compelling interest, but has rather addressed each case on an ad hoc ba-
sis. 22 1 However, the Supreme Court has noted that "a law cannot be regarded as protect-
ing an interest 'of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that sup-
posedly vital interest unprohibited." 222 In Lukumi, the Court found that the government's
purported interest in preventing animal cruelty was not compelling because the ordinance
only applied to the sacramental killing of animals and failed to prevent acts of animal
cruelty caused by other religious and secular animal killings.223 Hence, the government's
interest is not compelling if it restricts religiously motivated conduct but fails to restrict
other conduct that would produce the type of harm caused by the religious exercise.
224
In its comment to the HHS, the USCCB argues that the contraceptive coverage
mandate fails to further a compelling government interest because contraceptives do not
save lives or prevent disease, but rather "prevent the healthy state of pregnancy ... and
can actually introduce health risks.' 2 25 This argument serves as a basis for the USCCB's
contention that the government has left the interest that it seeks to protect - i.e., wom-
en's health exposed to the type of harm that contraceptives purportedly prevent.
226
218. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2730 (Doubleday, 2nd ed. 2003) (1994) ([E]very action
which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment or in the development of its natural
consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible is intrinsically
evil.") (quoting PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE § 14 (1968)).
219. Susan J. Stabile, Christian Realism and Public Life: Catholic and Protestant Perspectives: Article: An
Effort to Articulate a Catholic Realist Approach to Abortion, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 340, 365-66 (2010).
220. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb l(b) (2012).
221. Compare, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07 (holding that the government's interest in unifying unem-
ployment compensation rules to prevent fraudulent religious objections was not compelling), iwith United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982) (holding that the government's interest in unifying the collection of
Social Security taxes was compelling).
222. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (citations omit-
ted).
223. Id. at 546-47.
224. Id. at 546.
225. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 10-11.
226. Id. at 11.
22
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Indisputably, the use of birth control pills can increase women's risk of stroke and blood
clots; however, women who take birth control pills are less likely to develop blood clots
than women who become pregnant. 227 Therefore, a Catholic employer cannot success-
fully argue that the government has left considerable damage to the very interest that it
seeks to protect.
Along the same line of reasoning, the USCCB argues that because Congress did
not explicitly require the HHS to include contraceptives as a preventive service, the con-
traceptive coverage mandate cannot serve a compelling interest. 228 This argument is fal-
lacious because it presumes that a federal agency's interest is only compelling if the par-
ticulars of the regulation were previously specified by congressional statute.22 9 To the
contrary, agencies exist, at least in large part, to utilize their expertise and resources to
regulate technical areas of law, and courts will often rely on an agency's expertise in de-
termining that the government action furthers a compelling interest. 230 Here, the HHS's
decision to mandate contraceptive coverage is a direct result of the Institute of Medi-
cine's scientific study and is therefore a well-informed medical decision. 23 1 For these
reasons, courts should find that the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate serves a
compelling government interest.
With regard to the second prong of the strict scrutiny inquiry, the contraceptive
mandate is narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest in providing
women preventive health care. When evaluating whether a law is narrowly tailored as
applied to religious practice, courts consider three elements. 232 First, the government's
infringement of free exercise rights must be necessary - i.e., there can be no less restric-
tive alternatives by which the government could accomplish its compelling interest.
233
Second, the government action that infringes on religious exercise cannot be underinclu-
sive.234 That is, the government cannot fail to regulate activities that pose the same type
of harm that the government's purported compelling interest is designed to prevent.
235
By precluding underinclusive regulations, courts seek to ensure that the government will
not infringe on religious exercise when doing so will predictably fail to further a purport-
ed governmental interest.2 36 And third, the infringement must not be overbroad. 237 This
prohibition essentially repeats the first requirement that the government regulation must
be necessary; however, unlike the least restrictive alternative formulation, courts may
condemn a government regulation for being overbroad even if there are no less restric-
227. Natasha Singer, Health Concerns over Popular Contraceptives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/health/26contracept.html?pagewanted-all.
228. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 11 ("The law at issue here, at a minimum, admits of a construction
that allows no advancement at all of the interest of maximizing coverage for contraception ... as HHS is en-
tirely free not to declare them 'preventive services."').
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (relying on the agency's expertise to
determine that the State has a compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful speech).
231. See No Additional Cost, supra note 18.
232. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326-29 (2007).
233. Id. at 1326.
234. Id. at 1327.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1328.
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tive alternatives.
23 8
In contesting the legality of the contraceptive coverage mandate under the RFRA,
the USCCB argues that the mandate is underinclusive because many Catholic individuals
and employers will drop their health insurance coverage to avoid compromising their re-
ligious beliefs. 239 However, an evaluation of the PPACA reveals that the mandate is in
fact narrowly tailored. 240 Although some Catholic individuals and organizations may
contemplate dropping their health insurance coverage, the PPACA imposes a penalty on
individuals who do not obtain health insurance coverage as well as employers who do
not provide health plans to their employees. 24 1 These penalty provisions serve as en-
forcement mechanisms and will deter the majority of individuals and employers - not
just Catholic employers - from dropping coverage. 242 Therefore, the USCCB's argu-
ment that several Catholic individuals and employers will drop health insurance coverage
does not support a finding that the mandate is underinclusive.
Another arguable claim for underinclusiveness is that, notwithstanding the federal
mandate, several women will not have access to contraceptive coverage because the
HHS has allowed Catholic Churches and houses of worship to apply for religious exemp-
tions. Although the USCCB did not voice this objection in its comment to the HHS, this
argument was raised by a Catholic organization that sought exemption under California's
contraceptive coverage law, which contained a religious exemption identical to the one at
hand. 243 In that case, however, the California Supreme Court, finding that the State's
mandate was neutral, generally applicable, and did not fall under the Sherbert exception,
dismissed the issue of underinclusiveness. 24 4 Nevertheless, this argument of underinclu-
siveness is likely to resurface under a RFRA claim, and is therefore worthy of evalua-
tion.
In this situation, a court is not likely to find that the federal contraceptive mandate
is underinclusive because nonreligious employees generally comprise a small portion of
a Church's staff.24 5 Since the majority of church employees tend to share the same reli-
gious beliefs as their employer, the religious exemption will affect few women. 24 6 Con-
trariwise, the government can prove that granting exemptions to Catholic-based organi-
zations that employ non-Catholic workers - e.g., Catholic hospitals - would inhibit the
effectiveness of providing contraceptive coverage to women because doing so would
place a great number of women at risk of facing barriers to contraceptive access. 247 Be-
238. Id.
239. Picarello & Moses, supra note 28, at 11 ("[T]he mandate is not well tailored to the goal of expanding
access to coverage, because it encourages individuals and organizations to drop coverage." (citation omitted)).
240. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501, 1513, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 18091, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum, Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. California, 543 U.S. 816 (2004)
(No. 03-1618), 2004 WL 1900732 at *8 (arguing that the law mandating contraceptive coverage is far more
underinclusive than the ordinances in Lukumi because "it allows employers unilaterally to opt out altogether
from the provision of prescription drug coverage").
244. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 32 Cal. 4th 527 (Cal. 2004).
245. See Lowell, supra note 27, at 460.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 457 58.
24
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cause excluding such a large pool of workers would severely undermine the govern-
ment's interest in expanding contraceptive access to women, the government can demon-
strate that the mandate is not overbroad. 24 8 Since the federal mandate is neither underin-
clusive nor overbroad and is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's
interest, it is narrowly tailored.2 49 Therefore, the mandate does not violate the statutory
protections of the RFRA, and courts will not exempt Catholic employers who do not
otherwise qualify for an exemption under the contraceptive regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the federal government's contraceptive coverage mandate will greatly bene-
fit the reproductive health of women across the country, several Catholic employers will
be forced to contradict their religious teachings against the use of birth control. Because
the United States was founded upon and remains committed to the concept of religious
exercise free from governmental intrusion, the constitutionality and legality of the con-
traceptive coverage mandate are controversial issues, and courts will be called upon to
balance these competing public interests. Analysis of the free exercise doctrine reveals
that the HHS's contraceptive coverage mandate is a valid exercise of the government's
legislative power in light of Supreme Court precedent - in particular, Smith, Lukumi,
and 0 Centro. When Smith and Lukumi are read together, these cases stand for the prop-
osition that the contraceptive coverage mandate is neutral and generally applicable and
does not contain a system of individualized exemptions. Therefore, courts will presume
the mandate's constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause. However, the contracep-
tive coverage mandate does impose a substantial burden on Catholic employers' reli-
gious exercise, and therefore, pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in 0 Centro, the
mandate must withstand strict scrutiny to pass muster. Under this heightened standard of
judicial review, the government can demonstrate a compelling interest in providing
women preventive health care and that the contraceptive mandate is narrowly tailored to
advance this interest. Therefore, the federal contraceptive coverage mandate does not
constitute a violation of Catholic employers' constitutional or federally guaranteed free
exercise rights.
IDestyn D. Stallings
248. See Fallon, supra note 232, at 1328.
249. See id. at 1326.
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